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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-2211 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 FELIX DOMINGUEZ-RIVERA, 
                                           Appellant 
  _______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Criminal No. 1-14-cr-00088-001) 
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 3, 2020 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER, MATEY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 22, 2020 ) 
 _______________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________ 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
 Felix Dominguez-Rivera says his attorney provided ineffective assistance, failing 
to argue against a career-offender enhancement. The Government agrees that the career-
offender enhancement should not have been applied to Dominguez-Rivera but does not 
believe that error affected Dominguez-Rivera’s sentence. We conclude that the record 
shows prejudicial ineffective assistance and agree with Dominguez-Rivera that 
resentencing is necessary. So we will vacate and remand. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
No facts are in dispute. Felix Dominguez-Rivera pleaded guilty to distribution and 
possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and 28 grams or more of 
cocaine, and possession of a firearm as a felon. The Presentence Investigation Report 
(“PSR”) calculated a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category VI, leading 
to an advisory Guidelines range of 188–235 months’ imprisonment. As part of that 
computation, the PSR treated Dominguez-Rivera as a career offender based on, among 
other things, a prior Connecticut drug conviction. Although Dominguez-Rivera’s counsel 
raised several objections at sentencing, he did not challenge whether the Connecticut drug 
conviction constitutes a predicate offense for a career-offender enhancement. Instead, he 
argued that there were no “judicially noticeable documents that would show that Mr. 
Dominguez Rivera[] was convicted under a qualifying statute,” (App. at 41–42), which 
was strange given the documentation provided by the Government. And while the District 
Court accepted some of counsel’s arguments, the Court did not disturb the career-offender 
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enhancement, finding Dominguez-Rivera had two qualifying predicates, including his 
Connecticut drug conviction. 
The career-offender enhancement automatically raised Dominguez-Rivera’s 
criminal history to category VI. U.S.S.G. § 4B.1(b). At sentencing, the District Court 
departed downward to a criminal history category V.1 That produced an advisory 
Guidelines range of 168–210 months’ incarceration. The District Court then sentenced 
Dominguez-Rivera to 168 months’ confinement, stating, “I think a sentence within the 
guidelines is warranted and I’m going to sentence you at the bottom of the guidelines, the 
advisory guidelines that you find yourself in[,]” and that that anything more would be 
“unfair and gratuitous,” anything less “would depreciate the seriousness of the crime.” 
(D.C. Dkt. No. 113 at 26–27.)2 
Dominguez-Rivera appealed his conviction and sentence, but this Court dismissed 
the appeal, citing the appellate waiver in his plea agreement. He then filed a pro se motion 
to vacate his sentence, challenging the career-offender enhancement. The District Court 
denied the motion. We granted a certificate of appealability on two issues: 1) “his claim 
that sentencing counsel failed to argue that appellant’s 1996 conviction under Conn. Gen. 
 
1 A career-offender enhancement permits only a one-level downward departure. 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(3)(A). 
2 We note that the Government quoted from parts of the sentencing transcript that 
were not included in the appendix. While the transcript is obviously part of the record on 
appeal, we remind the Government of its obligation under Fed. R. App. P. 30(b) to 
designate those “parts [of the record] to which it wishes to direct the court’s attention.” We 
also remind Appellant of his obligation under that same rule to “include the designated 
parts in the appendix.” 
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Stat. § 21a-277(a) does not constitute a ‘controlled substance offense’ as defined in 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) for purposes of the career-offender Sentencing Guideline, U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.1” and 2) “on his alternative claim that, if Mathis permits application of the modified 
categorical approach to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-277(a), cf. United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 
569, 574–76 (5th Cir. 2016), then counsel failed to effectively argue that the conviction 
documents of record did not permit application of the modified categorical approach in this 
case.”3 (App. at 22.) 
II.  COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE DURING SENTENCING 
Ineffective assistance of counsel requires a “reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). That demands a showing that 
counsel’s conduct was unreasonable, resulting in prejudice. Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. 
Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1081 (3d Cir. 1985). 
A. Sentencing Counsel’s Failure to Cite Relevant Law Was Deficient 
 Conduct is deficient where the errors are “so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. For example, where an attorney “fails to object to an improper 
enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines, counsel has rendered ineffective 
assistance.” Jansen v. United States, 369 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2004). That imposes a 
 
3 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary 
review over legal issues and review factual findings for clear error. United States v. 
Travillion, 759 F.3d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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“duty to make reasonable investigations of the law” and “cite favorable decisions.” United 
States v. Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 336 (3d Cir. 2007). So failing to raise “readily available” 
authorities may be deficient. Id. 
 Here, counsel should have raised relevant case law to challenge the career-offender 
sentencing enhancement. For the enhancement to apply, there must be two qualifying 
predicate offenses. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). At issue is whether Dominguez-Rivera’s 
Connecticut drug conviction under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-277(a) qualifies under U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.2(b) as a predicate offense. That determination turns on a “categorical approach” 
that examines whether the state statute’s “elements are the same as, or narrower than, those 
of the generic offense.” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). At least one 
court has explained that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-277(b)4 is broader than the Guidelines 
definition of a controlled substance offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), because a “sale” of 
drugs under Connecticut law includes mere offers to sell, unlike the Guidelines. United 
States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 959, 964–66 (2d Cir. 2008). Arguably, this authority suggests 
that Dominguez-Rivera’s Connecticut conviction is not a predicate offense. 
 The “modified categorical approach” casts similar doubt. Under that test, where a 
statute is “divisible,” containing “alternative elements,” but not when it only outlines 
“alternative means,” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249; see also United States v. Williams, 898 
F.3d 323, 333 (3d Cir. 2018), a sentencing court may consider the charging documents and 
similar materials to decide whether they clarify the elements of the conviction. Shepard v. 
 
4 The relevant language in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-277(b) is identical to the language 
in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-277(a), which is the statute at issue in this case. 
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United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005). And if those elements match the Guidelines 
definition of a predicate offense, then the state conviction qualifies as a predicate offense 
too. 
 Here, the only relevant charging documents are the indictment for “Possession of 
Heroin with Intent to Sell” (App. at 46), an arrest warrant (App. at 45), and a judgment of 
conviction for “Sale of Hallucinogen/Narcotic” (App. at 44). Savage is again instructive 
on how we should read “sell” in a Connecticut law. 542 F.3d at 964–66. That is, a sale is 
to be read broadly to include mere offers to sell. Id. at 965. So Dominguez-Rivera’s 
conviction could involve only an offer to sell heroin or possession with intent to offer 
heroin, each of which falls outside the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 802(11) (defining “distribute” to mean “to deliver . . . a controlled substance” and 
“dispense” to mean “to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user”). As the charging 
documents do not make clear what Dominguez-Rivera pleaded guilty to, his conviction is 
not a qualifying predicate offense under the modified categorical approach either. United 
States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2009) (when reviewing Shepard charging 
documents, we are looking to determine “the specific part of [the statute] to which [the 
defendant] in fact pled guilty”). 
 And counsel should have raised at least one of these arguments before the 
sentencing court. Savage and Mathis both predate Dominguez-Rivera’s sentencing. There 
is no legitimate strategic purpose in declining to cite both of these cases, particularly since 
counsel did challenge the career-offender designation on other grounds. See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689. All the more so, given the appellate waiver included in the plea agreement. 
7 
 
Taken together, we conclude counsel’s failure to raise an argument against the applicability 
of a career-offender designation was deficient performance. 
B. Sentencing Counsel’s Deficient Conduct Likely Prejudiced Dominguez-Rivera 
 Dominguez-Rivera must also show that, if counsel had raised a challenge under 
Savage and Mathis to his career-offender designation, there is a reasonable probability that 
the “result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. An error in calculating 
a Guidelines range “can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability 
of a different outcome absent the error.” Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 
1907 (2018) (quoting Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016)). 
Here, counsel’s error materially disadvantaged Dominguez-Rivera in several ways. 
 First, without the career-offender designation, the criminal history level would be 
IV instead of V, producing an advisory Guidelines range of 155–188 months’ 
imprisonment instead of 168–210 months. Second, without the enhancement, the District 
Court has an option to depart downward again. Finally, though the District Court explained 
its reasoning for a 168-month sentence, we have noted that “an erroneous calculation of 
the defendant’s base offense level or criminal history will not be harmless, particularly 
when the sentence imposed suggests that the district court chose to adhere to the advisory 
Guidelines range.” United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 387 (3d Cir. 2013). Here, the 
District Judge did just that when he stated “I think a sentence within the guidelines is 
warranted . . . .” (D.C. Dkt. No. 113 at 26–27.) In all, there is a sufficient likelihood that 
the error impacted the outcome thereby prejudicing Dominguez-Rivera. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
As Dominguez-Rivera meets both prongs under Strickland for ineffective assistance 
of counsel, we will vacate and remand for resentencing. 
